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IT is a privilege for the Yale Law Journal to help celebrate the birthday of
Mr. Justice Black, and his more than eighteen years of valiant service on the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Our procedures for judging judges are not yet "scientific" in the ordinary
sense. And they never will be, any more than other forms of historical evalua-
tion. Whatever one's method, however, it is clear that Justice Black has had
a formidable and constructive impact bn the law, and that he has earned an
honorable place in the small company of strong Justices.
Character and philosophy are the ultimate sources of a strong judge's power.
Style and mind alone do not avail. To be a force in law, a judge's work must
be spun from a single thread. He must draw on a coherent view of what the
law is, and what it should be, in the light of its social, intellectual and moral
purposes. The judge's philosophy need not be written down in a credo. But
it must be there, if his work is to be more than a collection of fragments, with-
out pattern or direction.
So with character. The test of judges is many-sided, especially for those on
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Justices of the Supreme Court
nust balance historical and political forces of explosive power in defining the
limits of their duty. They must be craftsmen of the law, capable of placing
their work in the web of doctrine-for the order of the law is itself a goal of
many social values. They must be expert participants in American politics
and history. One of the most important qualities required of good Justices is
that they be sensitive, but not too sensitive, to the changing political realities
of a federal system; and equally sensitive to ideas intended to be beyond the
reach of transitory majorities-to the necessarily general aspirations of human
dignity found in the Constitution and in the dream of our public life. But
finally, the justices must be wise and humane judges, deciding cases that mean
life or death, property or status, justice or injustice, to individual litigants
and classes of litigants. It is sometimes easy to forget that a large part of
American constitutional law arises in the setting of actual lawsuits; one can
view the United States Reports as a hornbook of political theory only at the
risk of missing the point.
In terms of these criteria, and in the light of what an outsider can know
of the Court's work, Mr. Justice Black is an authentically strong judge, and a
distinguished one. No one student of the Court will agree with all Justice
Black's opinions, nor with all the positions and propositions that his opinions
represent. Thus it should be. Justice Black is not interested in acolytes. He
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has been seeking to persuade a mature audience to alter some of its most tena-
ciously held views. Justice Black knows better than anyone else that such
a major effort will take time, and that it may do much good even if it is not,
and should not be, fully successful. The work of the Court is necessarily collec-
tive. No judge, however strong, can expect to impose his views on an institution
that must move slowly if it is to retain its peculiar function in the process of
American politics.
Justice Black has done excellent work in many fields of law. His writing
has been marked by distinctive habits of thought. He has almost invariably
sought to re-examine the premises behind each problem that came to his hand.
Thus he has served as a skeptical outsider on the Court, preserving his detach-
ment, and insisting on a review of fundamentals, before accepting any given
rule. In this way, he has developed a constitutional position which is always
individual, and often provocative. The freshness of Justice Black's views has
been well served by a simple lucidity~of style, which has made his writing
an instrument of abiding power.
This prefatory note is not the place for a comprehensive review of Justice
Black's opinions. But two general aspects of his accomplishment as a judge
may be mentioned here.
First, it is now clear that Justice Black has proposed a radical, and debatable,
change in the relation of the Supreme Court to the Congress and to the state
legislatures, a change that would in many areas greatly reduce the traditional
power of the Court. Justice Black is never content to change precedents
alone. With surprising zeal, he seeks to hammer out fixed rules of constitu-
tional law. Such rules, he hopes, might bind future judges to refrain from
actions that he would regard as unwarranted interference with the prerogatives
of legislators. Many groups of opinions illustrate this aspect of his constitu-
tional philosophy. He would remit to Congress, for example, almost the whole
of the problem of dealing with state-imposed trade barriers that may be viewed
as "discriminating" against or "unduly burdensome" to interstate commerce.'
He would inter even the final memory of Adkins v. Children's Hospital 2 and
like cases, strictly refusing to find due process problems in the substance of
statutes regulating business conduct.3 The elected legislature, he profoundly
believes, must have the last word on a wide range of problems in any system
that hopes to be democratic.
A second major feature of the constitutional universe of Mr. Justice Black
is his conviction that the Supreme Court does have the right and duty to
strike down as unconstitutional much legislative or executive action that might
1. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (concurring opinion) ; Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
2. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See also, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 268 (1946) (dissenting opinion). See
also Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 319 U.S. 215 (1943).
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abridge the free and democratic character of the political process: restraints
on the citizen's freedom to vote; to agitate for political change; to speak,
write or think as he prefers; and above all, to live in an atmosphere of calm
assurance that he is protected against adverse action by the state, or by other
citizens, save in accordance with strictly prescribed procedures of law. Except
in a few conspicuous instances, Justice Black has steadily advocated the use
of judicial power to enlarge and fortify the law's protection for personal and
civil rights. His opinion in Korematsu v. United States 4 was a major failure;
and that in Duncan v. Kalzanamoku 5 was so cautious and limited that it did
not succeed in repairing the damage, although its major premise is in conflict
with that of the Korematsu case. Nor has Justice Black been altogether con-
sistent in dealing with the problem of searches and seizures.6 Variations of
this order aside, Justice Black has become a leader in the most significant task
confronting our system of law: the task of solving the problem of internal
security in accordance with the tradition of law. He starts with the undeniable
proposition that the state may defend itself against destruction, or attempted
destruction. But the means chosen to attain this end, he insists, must be within
the spirit and the control of the law. In his view, the law must reach out and
impose its standards on the systems of administrative and executive action
which now decide the rights of men and women to jobs, status and reputation
in many areas of public and private life.
7
Justice Black has taken on no cause more vital than this struggle to bring
the internal security program into the law. It is a task that will take years
of effort, on many fronts. It is not a problem the Supreme Court can solve
alone. But the Court can help lead the way to a solution. Justice Black has
already done memorable work in presenting the problem, and in sounding the
alarm, though not all his arguments are of equal weight. For there can be no
ambiguity about it. The security program has become a major threat to liberty.
The possibility of arbitrary and uncontrolled action by officers of the state,
often based on secret information, and governed by meaninglessly vague criteria
of judgment, is now a threatening force in millions of lives. This totalitarian
practice must not, and will not, endure. Twenty years from now, and perhaps
sooner, Justice Black will appear as one of the key figures in the process through
which the standards of the Constitution came to prevail over principles and
practices of tyranny.
4. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
6. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (dissenting opinion),
with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (concurring opinion) ; Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting, with Black, J., concurring).
7. See Justice Black's dissent in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 95 (1953). See
also Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 347 U.S. 439 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting, with
Black, J., concurring); Barsky v. New York Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 456 (1954)
(dissenting opinion); Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (concurring
opinion) ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) ; cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Conim. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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